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CASE COMMENTS

not all, states have long had class action remedies,48 although perhaps not as
efficient and workable as the federal rule.
The Court's decision is not only correct, but it also represents a wise
policy choice that might effectively be used in the future to question the
entire range of diversity jurisdiction. If the federal courts merely sit as
state courts in diversity cases and apply state substantive law, what is the
purpose of this duplication of jurisdiction? Federal intervention into diversity
cases might be limited to instances where there is a state inadequacy. No
such inadequacy has been shown to exist with class actions. Allowing aggregation of class members' claims in all circumstances to meet the jurisdictional
amount would only add to an already overloaded federal court system.
JAMES

E. AKER

PUBLIC UTILITIES: FLORIDA'S DUAL SYSTEM OF REGULATION
-A

DENIAL OF ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO
SOME CONSUMERS
Storey v. Mayo, 217 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1968)

Petitioner sought review of an order issued by the Florida Public Service
Commission approving a territorial service agreement between an electric
utility owned and operated by the city of Homestead, and a privately owned
public utility, Florida Power & Light Company. Prior to the agreement, petitioner, who resided outside the municipal limits of Homestead, was a
customer of the Florida Power & Light Company. As a private utility, Florida
Power & Light was subject to regulation by the commission.' By the terms
of the service area agreement approved by the commission, petitioner was
forced to accept service from the municipal utility, which by statute is exempt
from regulation by the commission.2 Petitioner contended that the challenged
agreement was contrary to public policy, in restraint of trade, and was a
denial of due process -and equal protection. The Florida supreme court
HELD, that the agreement, designed to avoid expensive competitive activity
outside the municipal limits, was valid, and that the commission's approval
was a proper exercise of the state's power to protect utilities from expensive
competitive practices. Petition d~nied. 3 Justices Caldwell and Ervin dissenting.
48. 67 C.J.S. Parties §13 (1950); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous
Litigants, 19 Cop-NELL L.Q. 399, 400 (1934).
1. FLA. STAT. §366.05 (1967).
2. FLA. STAT. §366.11 (1967).
3. 217 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1968).
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The fundamental obligations and rights of public utilities, established at
common law, remain basically unchanged in most states today. Certain
obligations are imposed upon public utilities because they are charged with
a public interest.4 Fundamental among these responsibilities is the obligation to serve that part of the public requesting service, 5 and to render such
service without discrimination 6 and at reasonable rates. This obligation is, of
course, limited to the utility's service area. In return the common law recognized the right of the utility to protection from competition within its
service area8 and its right to charge a reasonable rate for the service rendered. 9
The Florida Constitution of 1885 gave the legislature full power to enact
laws necessary for the regulation of public utilities.-o It was subsequently
established that the legislature had the power to delegate this authority to an
administrative agency,"' and in 1947 the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission was created.12 This commission continued in effect until 1967
when the Florida Public Service Commission was created.13 This later commission assumed the duties of its predecessor and was given the power to
prescribe all rules and regulations reasonably necessary and appropriate for
the regulation of public utilities.14 In granting the commission this power
the legislature declared the regulation of public utilities to be in the public
interest and a proper exercise of the state's police power.1 5 The legislature
also expressed its intent that the powers of the commission be liberally construed for the accomplishment of the commission's purpose. 16 However, by
expressly exempting municipal utilities from control of the commission the
legislature impliedly endorsed a system of dual control' for the regulation of
utilities within the state."'
4. City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas & Elec. Co., 65 Fla. 404, 410, 62 So. 919, 921
(1913).
5. Messer v. Southern Airways Sales Co., 245 Ala. 462, 466, 17 So. 2d 679, 682 (1944).
6. Demeter Land Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Co., 99 Fla. 954, 966, 128 So. 402, 407 (1930).
7. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184
F.2d 552, 567 (4th Cir. 1950).
8. Cf. Minneapolis K-St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959).
9. Miami Bridge Co. v. Miami Beach Ry., 152 Fla. 458, 473, 12 So. 2d 438, 445 (1943).
10. FLA. CONsT. art. 16, §30 (1885). This clause has been omitted from the constitution adopted in 1968, but such power has long been held constitutional as an inherent
police power of the state, State ex rel. Wells v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 Fla. 392, 395,
118 So. 478, 479 (1928). Additionally, FLA. CONST. art. 12, §10 (1968) provides that certain
provisions of the 1885 constitution, including article 16, that are not inconsistent with the
1968 Constitution shall be retained as statutes.
11. Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 412, 17 So. 2d 785, 786 (1944).
12. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 24095, §1.
13. FiA. STAT. §350.011 (1967).
14. FLA. STAT. §366.05 (1967).
15. FLA. STAT. §366.01 (1967).
16. Id.
17. Dual control in the sense that the state, through the Public Service Commission,
controls privately owned utilities while the municipalities control their own utilities free
from state regulation.
18. FLA. STAT. §366.11 (1967). "No provision of this chapter shall apply in any manner
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While the Florida supreme court has previously approved service area
agreements between two regulated utilities,19 the present decision is the first
concerning the validity of an agreement between a regulated and a nonregulated utility. There is no express statutory authority for the commission's
approval of such agreements. 20 The commission has, however, express authority to order improvements and extensions of service. 21 The commission
has taken the position that any service area agreement would limit this power
and would therefore be invalid without commission approval. 22 The courts
have long upheld such implied powers in similar agencies2 3 and have specifically upheld the commission's power to determine the validity of such
agreements between regulated utility companies.24 Florida Power & Light
Company was thus bound to submit the agreement for commission approval
before putting its terms into effect. The city of Homestead, however, expressly stated that it was not conceding commission jurisdiction over the
25
operation of its utility.
The weight of authority in the United States would hold such agreements
invalid.20 The justification for such a position is that such agreements are
generally in restraint of trade and are contrary to public policy.27 Even courts
holding such agreements valid have admitted that both the agreement and
the commission's approval are in derogation of the common law. 28
The agreement in the instant case appears on its face to be in violation of
chapter 542 of the Florida Statutes. 29 Nevertheless, the Florida supreme court,
in City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas System, Inc.,30 interpreted this statute as not
intended for literal application but as designed only to prevent undue or
unreasonable restrictions upon free competition. The court further indicated
that only those agreements that permit price and production control are undue restrictions on trade. In the instant case the court alludes to Peoples
Gas and seems to follow its reasoning. Peoples Gas held that the two utilities
could not control prices or production because of their regulation by .the
commission, and upheld a similar service area agreement. There is, however,
one major distinction between the cases. Peoples Gas dealt with two reguto utilities owned and operated by municipalities, whether within or without any municipality ....
19. E.g., City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas System, Inc., 182 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1965).
20. 217 So. 2d 304, 308 (Fla. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
21. FLA. STAT. §366.05 (1967).
22. City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas System, Inc., 182 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1965).
23. E.g., State ex rel. Wells v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 Fla. 392, 118 So. 478 (1928).
24. City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas System, Inc., 182 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1965).
25. 217 So. 2d 304, 307 (Fla. 1968).
26. E.g., Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Williams Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 263 F.2d. 431
(8th Cir. 1959).
27. Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409-10 (1889).
28. Ohio-Midland Light & Power Co. v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 123 N.E.2d .675,
678 (C.P. Ohio 1954).
29. FLA. STAT. ch. 542 (1967) prohibits restrictions in trade and commerce of any
article or service. No exception is made for utility companies.
30. 182 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1965).
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lated utilities, while in the principal case only the privately owned utility
was subject to commission regulation. Peoples Gas held that approval of the
agreement by the commission had the effect of an order binding upon both
parties. The consumers affected by the agreement were still protected by
the commission's regulation of both companies. Such is not the effect in the
instant case.
Florida's system of dual control has resulted in petitioner's forced acceptance of service from a utility over which neither he nor the state regulatory commission has any direct control. It has been said that since the people
themselves own the municipal utility, no regulation by the commission is
necessary 1 However, when the consumer is not a resident of the municipality
that owns the utility, this reasoning is inapposite. While consumers within
the municipality exercise some degree of control over the operation of the
utility,32 nonresident consumers have no controls.

Approval of the agreement has deprived petitioner and a substantial
number of other consumers of electricity produced by the Florida Power &
Light Company. Injury to the public from deprivation of the restricted parties' industry is a primary reason for holding such agreements void as against
public policy3a Because of the system of dual control, Florida Power & Light
was forced to enter the agreement to secure for itself one of the basic public
utility rights, that of protection from competition within its service area. The
city, while possessing a monopoly within its corporate limits, is also free to
serve consumers outside those limits. Such service and the resulting competition with Florida Power Sc Light led to the instant agreement. Approval of
the agreement bound Florida Power & Light to furnish service to consumers
within its designated areaA4 The city is not so bound to consumers within its
area. The city cannot be compelled to furnish service to those consumers
except upon approval by city authorities.35 While approval exists in the
instant case, it is clear that city authorities have the power to withdraw it.3
Petitioner's legal recourse in such a case would be an appeal to the same authority that had previously refused such service37 Because of the commission's
inability to regulate the municipal utility, the petitioner is left virtually unprotected and in a position possibly even less favorable than that of other
customers served by the municipal utility.38
The principal decision goes beyond that of Peoples Gas and raises serious
doubts as to the wisdom of Florida's dual system of utility regulation. The
petitioner is placed in an unfavorable position that would not be possible

31.

City of St. Petersburg v. Carter, 39 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1949).

32.

FLA. STAT. §172.02 (1967).

33. Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396 (1889).
34. City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas System, Inc., 182 So. 2d 429, 436 (Fla. 1965).
35. FLA. STAT. §172.06 (1967).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Long v. Town of Thatcher, 62 Ariz. 55, 153 P.2d 153 (1944), held that those persons
residing outside the municipality but served by the municipality's electric utility were entitled
to only "excess" power produced by the utility.
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